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worker can rent. However, the bankrupt does need a job. The
Court probably will not extend the doctrine very far, but will instead look to Congressional action in the area.
Glenn D. Brumfield
Bankruptcy-New Approach

To Dischargeability
On October 19, 1970, Congress enacted Public Law 91-467,
which radically altered the existing practice concerning bankruptcy
discharges.0 In considering the full impact of this new law, it will
be useful to consider some of the abuses it was meant to correct.
I. Introduction
Underlying the operation of bankruptcy discharge is the
basic concept that in return for surrendering his non-exempt assets
for the benefit of his creditors, the debtor will be discharged from
all his provable debts, except for those debts which might be expressly excepted by statute from the operation of that discharge.'
It can then generally be said that the bankruptcy law does equity
both to the creditor, because he can more easily discover and recover the debtor's assets, 4 and to the debtor, because it is "in the
interest of a sound public policy not to keep the debtor forever
in bondage to his debts, but to restore his energies to the business
community."5
Conceding that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to treat
both the creditor and the debtor fairly, two major sources of abuse have existed in the past which allow the creditor to circumvent
the discharge policy. These were: (1) once a bankruptcy court had
granted a discharge, the actual effect of this on any individual
creditor's claim would be determined in nonbankruptcy courts; and
(2) even if the debtor could have pleaded his discharge in the non' 84

Stat. 990 (U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4536 (1970)).
2 Although enkacted on Oct. 19, 1970 the new law will affect all cases filed

on and after Dec. 19, 1970. 84 Stat. 990 (US. Code Cong & Ad. News 4536, 4540
(1970)).

8In re Anderson 1 F. Cas. 831 (No. 351) (E.D. 1974). See generally
Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Collins, 150 W. Va. 655, 149 S.E.2d 221 (1966); RuhlKoblegard Co. v. Gillespie, 61 W. Va. 584, 56 S.E. 898 (1907).
4 7 H. REMtINGTON, A TREATIsE ON THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 2993 (6th. ed. 1955).
6Id. The impracticality of such a bondage can be seen if it is remembered
that many bankruptcies are the product of sincere, but inopportune, business

decisions, rather than fraudulent manipulations.
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bankruptcy court, the exceptions which the creditor could invoke
to except his claim from that discharge were susceptible to abuse,
especially in regard to the false financial statement.
II. Pleading Discharge in the Nonbankruptcy Court
Prior to the new law, a debtor was faced with a dilemma-a
dichotomy in regard to the operation of a bankruptcy discharge.
First, although the bankruptcy court was required to give a discharge unless a statutory ground of opposition had been proven,"
certain debts were expressly exempted from the operation of that
discharge. 7 Pursuant to judicial interpretation the practice arose
for the bankruptcy court to grant the discharge, but the issue of
whether any particular creditor's claim was excepted from the
operation of that discharge was to be determined in the nonbankruptcy court in which the creditor attempted to enforce the
debt.8 As one court stated, the rationale for this dichotomy was
that "the bankruptcy court is interested primarily in the speedy
0 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c) (1964) provides that the court "shall grant the discharge
• . ." unless certain grounds of opposition, therein listed, have been proven.
This provision had generally been interpreted to mean that the bankrupt has
a right to discharge, unless he has committed one of the offenses listed within
that section. Johnson v. Bockman, 282 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1960); Becker v.
Shields, 237 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1956); In re Walsh, 256 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1919).
Even though some jurisdictions have held that discharge is a matter of privilege rather than right, it seems safe to assert that essentially the same result
is achieved whichever view is taken. Some jurisdictions holding that discharge
is only a privilege are as follows. In re Tabibian. 289 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1961);
Williamson v. Williams, 137 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1943); Dixwell v. Scott and Co.,
115 F.2d 873 (1st Cir. 1940). See generally Comment Welfare Recipient's Right
to Pre-Termination Hearing, 73 W. Va. L. REv. 80 (1970-71).
7 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)
(Supp. V. 1970) lists those debts which are excepted
from discharge. These essentially are: (1) Certain taxes; (2) obtaining money
or property, including credit, through false pretenses or false representations;
(3) wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another; (4) alimony, child support, seduction, breach of promise to marry accompanied by
seduction, and criminal conversation; (5) debts not duly scheduled in time
for proof; (6) debts created by the debtor's fraud or embezzlement while acting
as an officer or fiduciary; (7) wages earned three months prior to the filing
of bankruptcy; and (8) moneys due to secure faithful performance.
6 Since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not specify the effect of a discharge,
the lower federal courts' practice was to refer the dischargeability issue to the
nonbankruptcy courts. This was officially approved in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234 (1934). See Countryman, The New Discharability Law, 45 REP. J.
(1971).
In the fourth circuit, as well as most other jurisdictions, this practice has
been strictly adhered to. "Not only does the bankruptcy court not have 'exclusive jurisdiction' to hear the case of excepting a claim , . . but there is a
policy, absent unusual circumstances, of refusing to exercise jurisdiction, i.e.,
of referring to the state court the effect of the discharge." In re Bell, 212 F.
Supp. 300, 302 (E.D. Va. 1962); See Gathany v. Bishopp, 177 F.2d 567 4th
Cir. 1949); In re Overkamp, 200 F. Supp. 782 (E. D. Va. 1962). See also First
Nat'l Bank v. Cootes, 74 W. Va. 112, 81 S.E. 844 (1914).
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settlement of the bankrupt's estate, and we do not believe that the
bankruptcy court should be required to stop and hear testimony
on whether various creditors have debts which are not dischargeable."" Another argument advanced in favor of this dichotomy was
that the submission of questions of fact to a summary procedure
would deprive the parties of the right to a trial by jury. 0 Therefore, even though the debtor may have been granted a discharge
in the bankruptcy court, he was still confronted by the possibility
that a creditor would sue him in a state court, in another proceeding, claiming that his particular debt was excepted from the operation of the discharge.
The spectre of prolonged litigation, involving two or more
separate actions in two or more different courts, was not the only
problem facing the bankrupt. Unless the debtor affirmatively
asserted his discharge as a defense in the nonbankruptcy court, he
was deemed to have waived that defense.", In fact, both the West
Virginia and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
require that this defense be affirmatively asserted, and unless this
is done, the bankrupt will be subject to a default judgment. 12
Because the bankrupt would be subject to a judgment in the
state courts unless he pleaded his discharge, creditors found the
situation easy to abuse. As seen in the legislative history to the
Dischargeability Bill, these abuses were centered around the fact
that many of the creditors brought suit in the state court after the
discharge "in the hope that the debtor will not appear in that
action, relying to his [the debtor's] detriment upon the discharge."' 3 And all to frequently the debtor did not appear in the
DWatts v. Ellinthorpe, 135 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir. 1943).
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 4854, 4856 (1970).
U'Gathany v. Bishopp, 177, F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1949); State v. Sims, 139
W. VA. 92, 79 S.E.2d 277 (1953); First Nat'l Bank v. Cootes, 74 W.VA. 112,
81 S.E. 844 (1914). Thus, if the bankrupt neglected to go into the state court
and plead his dischargeability he was subject to default judgment. This was
true even though the dischargeability issue and the discharge issue were pending simultaneously. For example, in Cootes the creditor had brought an action
in the state court to collect a debt owed by the debtor, and while that action
was pending the debtor was discharged in bankruptcy. The court stated that
"It]he state court does not lose jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
because he has been discharged in bankruptcy, pending the action or suit in
the state court, and unless he pleads his discharge a judgment may be rendered against him. By his failure to plead it he is deemed to have waived the
defense." First Nat'l Bank v. Cootes, 74 W. Va. 112, 113, 81 SLE. 844, 845
(1914).
(12Rule 8 (c) of both the Federal and the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively .. . discharge in bankruptcy... ' FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (c); W.
VA. R. Cxv. P. 8 (c).
13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD Naws 4954 (1970).

10 U.S.
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postbankrupty proceeding, not so much because of lack of concern,
but because he (1) had the misguided notion that the discharge
operated automatically, so that there was no necessity to appear in
the state court, (2) was unable to retain an attorney because of a
lack of funds, or (3) had had "sewer" service of process. 14 Another
consideration was that even if the debtor did manage to scrape the
funds together to retain an attorney for the postbankruptcy hearing,
he was in no position to suffer the costs of appeal, which the creditor could easily do, 15 nor could he afford the appeal bond required
by justice of the peace courts.
While prior to the new law the debtor could go into the
bankruptcy court and obtain an injunction against the creditor's
bringing action in the state courts, that remedy was only available
if he could prove that "unusual circumstances" existed. 0 However,
the debtor, upon pursuing this alternative, encountered at least
two major obstacles. First, the federal courts were not inclined to
find "unusual circumstances." Secondly, some jurisdictions, including the fourth circuit, had held that the doctrine of res judicata barred the debtor from gaining an injunction against the
creditor's postbankruptcy judgment if the debtor litigated or could
have litigated the issue of dischargeability in that proceeding but
failed to do so.' 7 All too often this procedure was turned to the
best interests of the creditor. This was accomplished by the creditor asking the bankruptcy court to rule on the dischargeability of
his claim prior to the granting of the discharge, because "unusual
circumstances" were present.' 8 This essentially accomplished a
two-fold purpose of barring the state courts from ever hearing the
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 This exception was first articulated in Local Loan Co. vs. Hunt, 292 U.S.

234 (1934). This same doctrine has been invoked in the fourth circuit, although it may be seen from the language of the following quotation that such
an injunction was difficult, at best, to obtain. "Only in exceptional circumstances, where irreparable injury would otherwise result, will the injunctive
power be used to restrain a creditor from attempting to collect a debt discharged in bankruptcy." Gathany v. Btshopp, 177 F.2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1949).
'7 Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263
(4th Cir. 1942). The doctrine of res
Judicata could also prove troublesome in an action to revive a prebankruptcy
judgment. Gathany v. Bishopp, 177 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1949).
is In Hamby v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., a real estate broker had mis-

appropriated money given him by the plaintiff to pay off certain liens. The
plaintiff went to the state court and obtained a judgment for the debt, the trial

court judge finding that the defendant had in fact misappropriated

the

money. Upon the defendant's filing for bankruptcy, the referee excepted that
debt from the discharge, and the circuit court upheld this "split discharge"
concluding that "Congress could not reasonably have intended that debts involving flagrant dishonesty of this sort should be granted a discharge." Hamby
v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1954).
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dischargeability issue, if the creditor were shopping for a forum,
and preventing the debtor from having a jury trial where the
exception being invoked by the creditor involved the proving of
fraud. This practice was known as getting a "split discharge."' 9
III. Litigation of the Dischargeability Issue
Even if the bankrupt had properly pleaded his discharge in
the nonbankruptcy court proceeding, the exceptions which the
creditor could invoke to exempt his claim from discharge- ° were
susceptible to abuse. The most frequently invoked ground for
exception was alledging that money or credit had been obtained by
false representations, 2' which allowed a creditor who had relied on
a materially false financial statement to claim that his debt was
excepted from the discharge. Due to the fact that the Bankruptcy
Act2= uses almost identical language as a ground for denying discharge altogether in the case of business bankrupts, 23 the creditor
had the alternative in that situation of either objecting to the discharge in the bankruptcy court or to withhold his objection and
thereafter claim that his debt was excepted in a postbankruptcy
2
proceeding. '
In order for the creditor to have his claim excepted from the
discharge on the basis of false representations, he had to show:

10 See
(1971),
20

Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 REF. J. 1, 4-7
for more information concerning this practice.

I1 U.S.C. § 35 (a) (Supp. V, 1970).

21 11 U.S.C. § 35 (a)

(Supp. V, 1970) provided that a debt would not be

discharged if it was a liability;
for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining
an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false
statement in writing respecting his financial condition made or
published or caused to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive .
22 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c)(3) (Supp. V, 1970). That provision says that no discharge will be granted if the debtor
while engaged in business as a sole proprietor, partnership, or as
an executive of a corporation, obtained for such business money or
property on credit or as an extension or renewal of credit by making
or publishing or causing to be made or published in any manner whatsoever a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial
condition or the financial condition of such partnership or corporation ....
3
In 1960 Congress amended § 14 (c) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act to limit the
use of false financial statements as a bar to total discharge to bankrupts who
had used that statement while engaged in business. 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c) (3) (1964),
as amended, 11 N.S.C. § 32 (c) (3) (Supp. v. 1970). The reason for this amendment was that a complete denial of discharge for a non business bankrupt was
too severe a penalty, especially since many of the false representations are
merely the result of carelessness. H.R. 11543, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., (1956); H.R.
106, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
24 Family Small Loan Co. v. Mason, 67 F.2d 207 (4th. Cir. 1933).
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"(1) That the defendants had made false representation; (2) that
these representations were relied upon in making the loan; and
(3) that these representations were made with the intent to deceive." 25 Although the burden of proving these elements was upon the creditor, 2 8 he was not in as difficult a position as it might
appear. Proof of the first element was only a question of evidence,
but, if abused, both innocent and fraudulent debtors were made to
suffer. The trap for the innocent was that all too frequently a
debtor made a false representation simply through his own carelessness or through his ignorance of the exact answers required by
the credit or loan application form.2 7 The second element also lent

itself to abuse. "There was a growing body of cases in a few jurisdictions finding that small loan companies, far from relying on
false financial statements, had deliberately procured such statements apparently as insurance against the borrower's later bankruptcy."28 The third element has been made easier to prove, at
least in West Virginia, by the state supreme court's holding that
"if a false representation of his financial condition is knowingly
made by a borrower to induce the lender to make a loan, intent
to deceive must be presumed."2 9
Another abuse, practiced by the more ingenius creditors, was
to have the debtor reaffirm his obligation after discharge by threatening to bring an action of fraud against him. 30 This reaffirmation
was allowable, because "a discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish the debt and the debtor may ... revive it by a new
mise [to pay]."'
IV. The New Law
Perhaps the most significant modification made by the
law is that courts of bankruptcy, and specifically referees,
given the additional jurisdiction necessary to determine the
chargeability of debts.3 2 This jurisdiction seems to include

pro-

new
are
dis(1)

23 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Collins, 150 W. Va. 655, 663, 149 S.E.2d 221, 226
(1966).
20 id.
27 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4854 (1970).
28 Countryman, The New DischargeabilityLaw, 45 RE'F. J. 1, 11 (1971).
20 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Collins, 150 W. Va. 655, 663, 149 S.E.2d 211, 228

(1966).

80 Hearings on S. 578, S. 1316, HR. 2517, HR., 2518 and H.R. 2519 Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26, 54-56,
58-60, 64-70, 72-80 at 77-78 (1967).
31 State ex rel. Bank of Ripley v. Thompson, 149 W. Va. 183, 188, 139 S.E2d
267, 271 (1964).
3211 U.S.C. § 11 (a) (12) (1964) has been amended b ythe new law to give
referees the power to "determine the dischargeability of debts, and render
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exclusive jurisdiction in regard to the dischargeability of what
were the most frequently used exceptions to discharge, and (2)
concurrent jurisdiction with nonbankruptcy courts in regard to
the remainder of the exceptions which may be invoked.
The bankruptcy court has been given exclusive jurisdiction to
hear the dischargeability issues when the creditor's asserted grounds
for exception rest on (1) false pretenses, false representations, false
financial statements, and wilful and malicious conversion of property, (2) fraud by an officer or fiduciary, or (3) liabilities for
wilful and malicious injuries to person or property. 3 These were
34
considered to the most frequently abused exceptions to discharge.
Although the new law nowhere expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy court, it achieves that effect. First,
if the creditor contends that his debt should not be discharged because of one of the exceptions stated above, he "must file an application for a determination of dischargeability [in the bankruptcy
court] . . . and unless an application is timely filed, the debt
shall be discharged." 35 The new law also provides that the bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin the parties from bringing or
continuing action to determine the dischargeability of any debt
which comes under these exceptions- prior to or pending the

judgements thereon." 84 Stat. 990 (U.S. CODE CoNc. & AD. NEws 4536 (1970)).
In conjunction with this, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (b) (1964) has been amended to
provide that the bankruptcy court has the power to fix a time for filing objections to the discharge and a time for filing applications to determine the
dischargeability of any particular debt. The times for filing are not to be less
than 30 days nor more than 90 days after the date set for the first creditors'
meeting, although the 90 day period may be extended at the discretion of the
court. The filing dates need not necessarily be the same for both the filing of
objections to the discharge and the filing of dischargeability issues. Id.
83 The new law rearranges, to a large extent, § 17 (a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (a) (Supp. V, 1970).
34The abuses the false financial statement has been subjected to have already been discussed in this paper. The provision for wilful and malicious
conversion had been abused due to the fact that the term "property" encompasses collateral, for example, a car. Thus, stories persist among bankrupty practitioners of the unreported cases finding the debtor guilty of wilful and malcoius conversion where he wears out the collateral through authorized use ......
Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 REr. J. 1, 14 (1971).
In regard to the exception for fraud by an officer or fiduciary, the Supreme
Court has interpreted "fiduciary" to mean the relationship created by technical or express trusts. Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U.S. 182 (1907). However, "fiduciary" has not been so consistently applied by other courts, and at times there
is much argument as to whether a simple debtor-creditor relationship or a
fiduciary relationship exists. See Hamby v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217
F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1954).
35 New § 17 (c) (2) ; 84 Stat. 990 (U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Nmws 4536, 4539
(1970)). [hereinafter cited as New Law]

aB$upra, n.34.
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bankruptcy court's consideration of the discharge.37 Finally, after
the discharge has been granted, the creditor is barred from bringing

suit elsewhere, because the new law provides that the order of discharge "shall declare that any judgment theretofore or thereafter
obtained in any other court is null and void as a determination of
the personal liability of the bankrupt .... "38 Furthermore, the order
of discharge shall "enjoin all creditors whose debts are discharged
from thereafter instituting or continuing any action or employing
any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the bankrupt."3 9 Therefore, although not expressly conferred, it can be seen
that the bankruptcy court does have exclusive jurisdiction over
these three exceptions, because the creditor cannot have the dischargeability issue decided elsewhere pending the bankruptcy proceedings, and he is enjoined from doing so afterwards.
In regard to the other exceptions listed in section 17 (a) of the
Bankruptcy Act,4 0 the bankruptcy court has been given concurrent
jurisdiction to determine dischargeability along with nonbankruptcy courts. New section 17 (c) (1) provides that "the bankrupt or any creditor may file an application with the court for the
determination of [the dischargeability of] any debt."4 1 Since this
is an optional provision, if neither party files an application, the
42
debt may be determined in a nonbankruptcy court.
There are two immediate problems which arise under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon the bankruptcy court. First,
how is the bankruptcy court going to effectuate its determinations?
New section 17 (c) (3) provides that "the court shall determine
the dischargeability of any debt from which an application... has
been filed, shall make such orders as are necessary to protect or
effectuate a determination that any debt is dischargeable and, if
any debt is determined to be non-dischargeable, shall determine
the remaining issues, render judgment, and make all orders necessary for the enforcement thereof." 43
The second problem arises from the fact that the new law
does not "affect the right of any party, upon timely demand, to a
trial by jury, where such right exists." 4" The obvious question is:
83New Law § 17 (c) (4), amending US.C. § 35 (1964).
38

New Law § 17(0, amending 11 US.C. § 32 (1964).

so id.

40 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
41 New Law § 17(c) (1), amending 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
42 However, note that this application is not optional but required if the
exceptions being invoked are those given in note 56 supra.
43New Law § 17(c) (3), amending 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
44New Law § 17(c) (5), amending 11 U.S.C. §35 (1964).
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when does a right to trial by jury exist? Perhaps no such right exists per se in determining the issue of dischargeability, 45 but it
would seem that this right would arise when the factual issues
raised in dischargeability are jury issues as provided for by statute
or by constitution-that is, when the amount or liability is in
question. Collateral to the issue of determining when the right to
a trial by jury exists, is the issue of determining who will conduct
the jury trial, a judge or a referee. This issue was considered by
Congress in its 1969 hearings. 4 Probably any jury trial must be
conducted by the judge, rather than the referee.
Although the conferring of additional jurisdiction upon the
bankruptcy courts was the primary change made by the new law,
there were other changes to effectuate the discharge order. The
form of the order of discharge has been changed by new section
14 (f) .4 New section 14 (h) requires the bankruptcy court to give
notice to creditors and other interested parties of those debts which
were determined to be nondischargeable, which applications were
still pending, and the contents of the order of discharge. That
notice has to be given within 45 days after the order of discharge
4
becomes final. 1
New section 14 (g) provides that the final order of discharge
may be registered in any federal district court, in order to enable
49
the debtor to have it enforced there.
Another change made by the new law is revocation of discharge. Prior to the new law, once the discharge was granted the
bankruptcy court had little control over the bankrupt unless the
discharge had been obtained by fraud. New section 15 authorizes
revocation of discharge for refusal to obey an order of, or to answer a material question approved by the court.50

45

Countryman, The New DischargeabilityLaw, 45 RFr. J. 1 (1971).

46 Hearings on H.R. 6665 and H.R. 12250 Before a Subcomm. of the House

Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 69 (1969).
4T New Law § 14(0, amending 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). The order of dis-

charge is required to;
(1) declare that any judgment theretofore or thereafter obtained in any other court is null and void as a determination of the personal liability of the bankrupt with respect to any of the following: (a)
debts not excepted from the discharge under subdivision a of section
17 of this Act; (b) debts discharged under paragraph (2) of subdivision c of section 17 of this Act; and (c) debts determined to be discharged under paragraph (3) of subdivision c of section 17 of this
Act; . . . .

Law § 14(h), amending 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1964).
Law § 14(g), amending 11 U.S.C. § 32 1964).
b0New Law § 15, formerly 11 U.S.C. §53 (1964).
48 New
49 New
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V. Conclusions
The new law will probably cure many of the abuses practiced
by unscrupulous creditors. Regarding the dischargeability of debts,
the most notable change is that the creditor will not be able to use
the ignorance or poverty of the debtor to obtain judgments in the
state courts. However, due to the fact that many details are left out
of the new law, especially with regard to jury trial and collateral
issues which may be considered in determining dischargeabilityr
a good deal of case testing and practical application will be needed
before the precise contours of the law can be discerned.
Stephen P. Swisher
51 Consider for example the issue of whether the bankruptcy count will
have jurisdiction to determine tax issues as they come up in dischargeability.

Constitutional Law-Disclosure of
Journalist's Confidential
News Sources
Earl Caldwell, a black newspaper reporter for the New York
Times, was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury concerning his knowledge of activities of the Black Panther Party.
The information sought by the government was secured by Caldwell through interviews with various party officers and spokesmen.
Caldwell and the Times contended the first amendment precluded
disclosure, and that compelled appearance before the grand jury
would have a chilling effect on first amendment freedoms. Accordingly, they asked that the subpoena be quashed; or in the alternative, be limited to protect Caldwell's confidential news sources.
After making a preliminary standing ruling," a California District
Court held that Caldwell, as everyone else, had a public duty to
appear before a grand jury when subpoenaed; but that under the
circumstances he was entitled to a qualified privilege of confiden1The
district court initially referred to the now familar "personal stake
in the outcome" standing criteria of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Yet the
court upheld the standing of the New York Times to join with Caldwell on the
basis of Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). In Camp, the Court held the personal "stake" need not be a strict
legal interest, such as a property interest. Accordingly, for the purpose of
standing, it was held sufficient for the party seeking relief to show the challenged action has and will cause him "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."
Id. at 152.
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